



ECOWAS COMMISSION
COMMISSION DE LA CEDEAO
COMISSÃO DA CEDEAO



Management Performance Compendium

2022 – 2026

An End-Of-Term Accountability Record

July 2026

Abuja, Federal Republic Of Nigeria

Foreword

This Compendium presents the honest record of the ECOWAS Commission management for the term 2022–2026. It is prepared as an end-of-term accountability record and handover document for the incoming leadership, in the spirit of institutional continuity and accountability. It does not seek to praise or to defend. It seeks to record what was done, what was not, and why - so that the incoming management may build upon what worked and address without illusion what did not.

The 2022–2026 term unfolded in an operating environment more challenging than any faced by ECOWAS in the past two decades: the January 2025 withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger; a Community Levy revenue reduction of approximately twenty per cent; four years of regional inflation averaging above fifteen per cent; and the continued expansion of terrorism from the Sahel into the coastal states. Against this backdrop, the management delivered on parts of its mandate - the Counter-Terrorism Brigade Roadmap, the Golden Jubilee legacy instruments, the sustained macroeconomic recovery, the peaceful conduct of six national elections, and the restoration of Guinea to constitutional order - while other objectives, including the full activation of the Counter-Terrorism Brigade and comprehensive re-engagement with the AES States, remain works in progress that fall to the incoming management.

Consistent with the Authority's directive at its Sixty-Ninth Ordinary Session in Lungi on 19 July 2026, this Compendium acknowledges what was achieved and, in equal measure, identifies constraints that limited implementation, resources that proved insufficient, and areas where political will remained inconsistent. It is offered as an evidence-based platform for the strategic choices the incoming management must make for 2026–2030.

H.E Dr. Omar Alieu Touray
President, ECOWAS Commission (2022–2026)
Abuja, July 2026



Executive Summary

This Compendium documents the performance of the ECOWAS Commission and Community Institutions across the 2022–2026 management term. It draws on the 2025 Annual Report on the State of the Community, the 2026 Interim Report, the Final Communiqué of the 69th Ordinary Session (Lungi, 19 July 2026), the reports of the 56th Ordinary Session of the Mediation and Security Council and the 96th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, the Final Report of the 39th Administration and Finance Committee, and the audited financial statements and human resources data compiled through 30 June 2026.

The record in brief

The Community's economies demonstrated resilience. Regional growth accelerated from 4.3 per cent in 2024 to 4.6 per cent in 2025, with 5.0 per cent projected for 2026. Regional average inflation fell from 24.4 per cent in 2024 to 16.8 per cent in 2025. The Community concluded five national elections that met Constitutional Convergence Principles, restored Guinea to constitutional order, and preserved the free movement architecture that remains ECOWAS's most enduring achievement.

At the same time, the management inherited and continued to face profound structural constraints. The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, effective 29 January 2025, removed approximately twenty per cent of the Community Levy base. As at 15 June 2026, Community Levy arrears stood at UA 595.69 million, representing 21.5 per cent of all levy assessed since July 2003, with five Member States-Nigeria, Guinea, Benin, Cabo Verde and Côte d'Ivoire-accounting for 88.5 per cent of arrears. The Commission carried 448 vacant positions at the close of the term. Sahel terrorism expanded further, with 401 recorded incidents between January and May 2026 alone and coastal states-Benin, Togo and Northern Nigeria-registering the sharpest increases in fatalities.

What was delivered?

- **Peace and Security:** The Revised Roadmap for the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Brigade was endorsed, with full operational capability targeted for July 2027; the Special Envoy on Counter-Terrorism's mandate was renewed for three years; eight National Centres for the Coordination of Response Mechanism became fully operational; three stabilisation deployments continued (ECOMIG, ESSMGB, and the Mano River technical mission).
- **Governance and Rule of Law:** Presidential elections in Benin (April 2026), Guinea (Presidential in December 2025 and Legislative in May 2026), Cabo Verde (Legislative in May 2026) and Côte d'Ivoire (Presidential in October and Legislative in December 2025) were held peacefully; the Community Court of Justice held seventy-nine sessions in 2025; the GIABA mutual evaluation of

the region was completed and Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal exited the FATF Grey List.

- **Economic Integration:** The Authority reaffirmed the 2027 launch of the ECO, now on a phased basis; the name "ECO" was registered with the OAPI; Guinea was approved to join the Presidential Task Force; the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme continued to operate across all remaining Member States.
- **Infrastructure and Digital:** The Inter-Governmental Agreement on the African Atlantic Gas Pipeline was signed with the Kingdom of Morocco; the Revised Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection and the Regional Cybersecurity Coordination Mechanism were adopted; and the Regional Air Transport Economic Oversight Committee was established.
- **Institutional:** The Golden Jubilee (ECOWAS@50) was successfully commemorated; the Presidential Declaration on Advancing Gender Parity in Political Representation as well as the Declaration on the Compact of the Future of Regional Integration were adopted as a flagship legacy instruments; the Government of the People's Republic of China constructed and donated the new Commission Headquarters in Abuja.

What remains for the incoming management?

- Six matters require decisive action from the incoming leadership within its first twelve months: (i) completing the AES structured engagement under Chief Negotiator H.E. Dr. Lansana Kouyaté, whose mandate was extended by the Authority to December 2026; (ii) achieving the phased launch of the ECO in 2027 with converged Member States and the convening of the Presidential Task Force before the December 2026 Ordinary Summit; (iii) securing sustainable Community financing, including the reduction of levy arrears and the finalization of the EU Pillar Assessment; (iv) activating the Counter-Terrorism Brigade to full operational capability by July 2027, which requires USD 481.46 million per year in secured funding; (v) delivering an investment-ready regional infrastructure portfolio across transport, energy, digital connectivity and water; and (vi) completing the organogram right-sizing exercise and filling critical vacancies without compromising the fiscal position.

The full analysis, evidence, and forward priorities are set out in the chapters that follow. The Annex Volume, published separately, contains the detailed data tables, the AES Risk Register, the organogram breakdown, the complete list of statutory decisions, and the case-by-case record of Community Court judgments.

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List of Abbreviations

AAGP	African Atlantic Gas Pipeline
AES	Alliance of Sahel States (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger)
AFC	Administration and Finance Committee
AfDB	African Development Bank
CCJ	Community Court of Justice
CCDS	Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff
CET	Common External Tariff
CL	Community Levy
CSF	Community Strategic Framework
ECOMIG	ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
EOM	Election Observation Mission
ESSMGB	ECOWAS Stabilization Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau
ETLS	ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force

FRSD	ECOWAS Regional Stabilisation and Development Fund
GFA	General Framework Agreement (ECOWAS–AES)
GIABA	Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HoS	Heads of State
ICPNC	Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion (Sierra Leone)
MER	Mutual Evaluation Report (GIABA)
MRU	Mano River Union
MSC	Mediation and Security Council
NCCRM	National Centre for the Coordination of Response Mechanism
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
OAPI	African Intellectual Property Organisation
OSG	Office of the Secretary General
SIGMAT	Système Informatique de Gestion des Marchandises en Transit
SPME	Strategic Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate
UA	Unit of Account (ECOWAS currency of account)

UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VP	Vice President
WAHO	West African Health Organization
WAMA	West African Monetary Agency
WAMI	West African Monetary Institute
WAPP	West African Power Pool



ECOWAS COMMISSION MANAGEMENT



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ECOWAS 4x4 Management Scorecard

2022 – 2026 • End-Of-Term Performance Simulation

Composite Index
71–73%

Confirming That 2022-2026 Management Successfully Preserved And Advanced ECOWAS's Institutional, Governance And Integration Agenda Under Exceptionally Adverse Conditions, While Significant Unfinished Business Remains In Counter-Terrorism Deployment, Sustainable Financing, AES Re-Engagement, And Workforce Restructuring

Peace & Security

65%

- Counter-Terrorism Brigade Roadmap
- National Centres For Response (8/12)
- ECOWAS Standby Force Readiness
- Peace Support Missions (ECOMIG, ESSMGB)
- Guinea Return To Constitutional Order
- AES Security Engagement
- Terrorism Containment

Institutional Architecture Improved, But Outcomes Constrained By Worsening Terrorism & Funding Gaps.

Economic Integration

70%

- ECO Single Currency (2027 Reaffirmed)
- Common External Tariff
- ETLS Implementation
- Free Movement Protocol
- SIGMAT Deployment (All Except Guinea-Bissau)
- Single Window Platforms (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal)
- Trade Barrier Elimination

Strategic Integration Architecture Preserved & Strengthened Despite Political Fragmentation.

Good Governance

78%

- Election Observation Missions (9 Deployments)
- Constitutional Elections (Peaceful)
- Guinea Democratic Transition
- Community Court Activity (79 Sessions In 2025)
- AML/CFT Compliance (GIABA Advances)
- FATF Grey List Exits (Burkina, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal)
- Prevention Of Coups (Guinea-Bissau Seizure)
- Enforcement Of Court Judgments

Governance Systems Improved Materially Although Political Instability Remained Beyond ECOWAS' Direct Control.

Inclusive & Sustainable Dev.

72%

- One Health Strategy
- Youth Training (9,120 Trained)
- Job Creation (~5,025 Jobs)
- School Feeding (1.38M Meals)
- Gender Parity Declaration
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Health Financing Sustainability
- Climate Adaptation Response

Heavily Constrained By External Financing Shocks And Demographic Pressures.

● Achieved ● Partially Achieved ● Not Achieved / Weak

ECOWAS 4x4 Management Scorecard

2022 – 2026 • End-Of-Term Performance Simulation

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Confirming That 2022-2026 Management Successfully Preserved And Advanced ECOWAS's Institutional, Governance And Integration Agenda Under Exceptionally Adverse Conditions, While Significant Unfinished Business Remains In Counter-Terrorism Deployment, Sustainable Financing, AES Re-Engagement, And Workforce Restructuring

Enabler 1: Capable Institutions



- Vision 2050 Anchored Institutionally ●
- New ECOWAS Headquarters Delivered ●
- Strategic Framework Operationalized ●
- Vacancy Reduction Efforts Underway ●
- 448 Vacancies Remaining ●
- Organogram Review Initiated ●

Assessment:

Institutional Resilience Remained Strong Despite Staffing Shortages.

Enabler 2: Equitable Partnerships



- China Headquarters Project ●
- Morocco AAGP Partnership ●
- AU And UN Security Cooperation ●
- EU Pillar Assessment ●
- Development Partner Funding Stability ●
- Private Sector Engagement (Business Council) ●

Assessment:

Partnerships Expanded Strategically, But Donor Dependency Remains A Significant Vulnerability.

Capable Institutions

68%



- Vision 2050 Anchored
- New HQ Delivered
- Strategic Framework Operationalized
- Vacancy Reduction Underway
- 448 Vacancies Remaining
- Organogram Review Initiated

Equitable Partnerships

75%



- China HQ Project
- Morocco AAGP Partnership
- AU & UN Security Cooperation
- EU Pillar Assessment
- Dev. Partner Funding Stability
- Private Sector Engagement (Business Council)

● Achieved

● Partially Achieved

● Not Achieved / Weak

PART



Strategic Context

CHAPTER 1

INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

1.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out, first, the institutional landscape inherited by the 2022–2026 management on assumption of office, and, second, the operating environment that shaped the term. The two are treated together because they are inseparable: what could be achieved was constrained by what was inherited and by what changed in the external environment. The chapter is deliberately brief; the detailed data supporting each section are set out in the Annex Volume, published separately.

1.2 The Institutional Landscape Inherited (2018–2022)

The 2022–2026 management inherited an institutional configuration whose strengths and weaknesses had crystallized over the preceding decade. The strengths were substantial. The Community Strategic Framework 2023–2027 was in advanced preparation; Vision 2050 had been adopted; the Community's peace and security architecture rested on the 1999 Protocol, the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the Conflict Prevention Framework. The Common External Tariff was operational across all Member States. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, though under-utilized, remained the principal instrument of intra-regional trade preference. The West African Health Organization, GIABA, the Community Court of Justice, the Parliament and the Office of the Auditor General each occupied a stable place in the Community architecture.

The weaknesses were equally durable. The single currency programme had been repeatedly postponed since 1987; convergence had proved unattainable. The Community Levy—the principal instrument of Community financing—was chronically under-mobilised, with arrears accumulating year on year. Free movement in law had not translated into free movement in practice, with harassment at internal borders persisting. And the region's response to unconstitutional changes of government—five military coups between 2020 and 2023—had exposed the limits of the Community's coercive enforcement capacity. The 2018 organogram, though comprehensive in design, had never been fully staffed.

1.3 The Operating Environment (2022–2026): Four Structural Constraints

The 2022–2026 term unfolded within four structural constraints that materially shaped what the management could deliver. Each is set out below as a matter of record, without recrimination.

1.3.1 The AES withdrawal

On 28 January 2024 the Governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger issued a joint communiqué announcing their withdrawal from ECOWAS. The withdrawal became effective, in accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Treaty, on 29 January 2025. The three States thereafter constituted themselves as the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel - AES). The Community was reduced from fifteen to twelve Member States. The three withdrawing States accounted for approximately twenty per cent of the Community Levy base, a substantial share of the ECOWAS territory, and a set of security cooperation relationships central to the region's counter-terrorism architecture.



In response, H.E. Dr. Lansana Kouyaté, former Prime Minister of Guinea and former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, was appointed Chief Negotiator on 25 March 2026, and by establishing the Negotiation Secretariat Team led by the Acting Secretary General and the Technical Support Team drawing on the Commission's Directorates. The negotiating mandate covers free movement of persons, trade and economic cooperation, development cooperation, and the preservation of existing regional integration gains; peace and security was excluded from the initial stage.

At the 69th Ordinary Session (Lungi, 19 July 2026), the Authority extended the Chief Negotiator's mandate to December 2026 and reaffirmed that negotiations with the three AES States would proceed exclusively as a unified block, with Member States refraining from separate bilateral agreements that could compromise Community cohesion.

1.3.2 The macroeconomic environment

The term coincided with an exceptionally difficult global and regional macroeconomic environment. Between 2022 and 2024, the region absorbed the compounding effects of the residual COVID-19 shock, the food and fertiliser price disruption following the Russia-Ukraine war, and the tightening of global financial conditions that raised debt-service costs. Regional inflation peaked at 24.4 per cent in 2024. Nigeria carried out its fuel-subsidy reform in May 2023, tripling petrol prices in the short term. Ghana's public debt reached 105 per cent of GDP and required a USD 3 billion IMF Extended Credit Facility and a USD 26 billion debt restructuring.

Recovery began in the second half of the term. Regional growth accelerated from 4.3 per cent in 2024 to 4.6 per cent in 2025, with 5.0 per cent projected for 2026. Regional inflation fell from 24.4 per



cent in 2024 to 16.8 per cent in 2025. Public debt-to-GDP ratios began to decline; the current account improved; the fiscal deficit widened moderately. The Community's macroeconomic outlook, as noted by the Authority at Lungi, is favourable, notwithstanding the fiscal-deficit reservation. But the four-year period as a whole was one in which convergence criteria for the

single currency were substantively unmet across the great majority of Member States, and the fiscal space of Member States was compressed—a compression that transmitted directly into Community Levy under-mobilization.

1.3.3 The security landscape

Regional security continued to deteriorate. In the Sahel, the two principal armed groups (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) expanded operational reach; in Burkina Faso, approximately half of national territory was assessed to be beyond effective State



control by 2024. Terrorism spread southward. In the first five months of 2026 alone, 401 terrorism-related incidents were recorded across the AES, Nigeria, Benin and Togo; Northern Benin recorded 305 militant-Islamist fatalities in 2025, the deadliest year on its record. In Northern Nigeria, banditry and mass abductions of schoolchildren continued, prompting a specific expression of solidarity by the Authority at Lungi.

Against this deterioration, the Community advanced work on the regional Counter-Terrorism Brigade. The 1,650-personnel Force was validated by the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff; the Revised Roadmap was endorsed by the Authority at Lungi with full operational capability targeted for July 2027; and the annual funding requirement was assessed at USD 481.46 million. As at May 2026, only five Member States-Nigeria, Liberia, The Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau-had made the Community Levy arrears payments earmarked for the Brigade. The Gulf of Guinea, by contrast, remained a success story: piracy incidents continued at historically low levels, with only one reported incident in the first quarter of 2026.

1.3.4 The development-partner environment

The external financing environment tightened materially in the second half of the term. In January 2025 the United States Government terminated most USAID programming; independent modelling estimated approximately 1,000 additional maternal deaths across six vulnerable West and Central

African countries in 2025 as a direct consequence, with Nigeria alone estimated to have lost over USD 600 million in health funding. The EU Pillar Assessment, on which the Community had worked since 2013, remained in the preparation phase, with pre-audit sessions conducted with the EU Pillar Champions and a benchmarking mission to SADC completed in November 2024. Bilateral partners maintained engagement but at reduced intensity in several thematic areas. The Community's dependence on external financing thus became more, rather than less, exposed over the term.

1.4 Strategic Frameworks Guiding the Term

Three frameworks guided the management's strategic choices. Vision 2050, adopted in 2022, set out the long-term aspiration of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Community of Peoples across five pillars-peace and security; regional integration and interconnectivity; governance and rule of law; sustainable development; and inclusive human development. The Community Strategic Framework (CSF) 2023–2027 operationalised Vision 2050 into fifteen strategic objectives and one hundred and eighty outputs; it entered its implementation phase in 2023. The 4x4 Objectives Framework, adopted internally by the Commission, translated the CSF into four cross-cutting priorities for the management's day-to-day direction - Enhanced Regional Peace and Security, Deeper Economic Integration, Good Governance, and Inclusive and Sustainable Development, along with two enablers: capable institutions and equitable partnerships.




These frameworks proved durable through the term. They were not abandoned or fundamentally revised, notwithstanding the AES withdrawal and the compression of resources, and they provided the structural continuity that the incoming management inherits. Parts II and III of this Compendium report performance against them.

1.5 Summary and Implications for the Reader

The 2022–2026 term operated within an inheritance of stable frameworks but chronic under-mobilisation, and within an environment shaped by an unprecedented institutional shock (the AES withdrawal), macroeconomic turbulence followed by recovery, worsening insecurity in the Sahel and its southward diffusion, and a contracting development-partner environment. This context is essential for reading Parts II and III of this Compendium. Where achievements are documented, they were achieved within these constraints. Where shortfalls are documented, the constraints are their principal explanation. The tone of this record is deliberately neutral: the management neither claims that outcomes were solely of its making nor attributes shortfalls to any single actor. The record is presented so that the incoming management may draw its own conclusions and set its own priorities.

PART



Performance by Vision 2050 Pillar

CHAPTER 2

PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY

2.1 Introduction

Peace and security constituted the highest-order challenge of the term. The management operated against the backdrop of expanding Sahel terrorism, five military coups between 2020 and 2023 (the last two occurring within the term itself), one internal-order breakdown in Guinea-Bissau in November 2025, and land-border tensions along the Mano River. Against this backdrop, the Community advanced work on the regional Counter-Terrorism Brigade, sustained three peace-support deployments, preserved the maritime security dividend in the Gulf of Guinea, and completed political mediation and Standby Force preparedness cycles. This chapter records what was delivered, what was not, and why.

2.2 The ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Brigade

The Counter-Terrorism Brigade was the single largest new security capability decision of the term. Authorised by the Authority in December 2023 at a total strength of 1,650 personnel, its deployment was validated by the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff at meetings held in Freetown (24–27 February 2026) and by videoconference on 9 May 2026. The Revised Roadmap was formally adopted at the 69th Ordinary Session (Lungi, 19 July 2026), with phased implementation timelines targeting full operational capability by July 2027. Consultations on the location of the Force Headquarters between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria are to be facilitated by the Commission.

Funding remains the principal risk to activation. The annual funding requirement is assessed at USD 481,459,835. As at May 2026, only five Member States—Nigeria, Liberia, The Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau—had made the Community Levy arrears payments earmarked for the Brigade. Member States that



have not yet done so are to fulfil their pledges urgently, with the President of the Commission

mandated to engage relevant Member States on expediting the remittance of outstanding Community Levy arrears before the end of 2026. The remaining constraint is not conceptual-the doctrine, force structure and legal basis are settled-but material: without the pledged Levy arrears and Member State contributions, the Brigade cannot deploy at the scale for which it was designed.

A second, procedural risk was recorded in the term. The Republic of Guinea, having initially pledged a motorized infantry company, subsequently withdrew that contribution. The Commission and the CCDS worked to identify replacement contributions, but the incident illustrated the fragility of pledges in the absence of a binding contribution mechanism. This is a matter that the incoming management will need to address in operationalising the Brigade.

2.3 The ECOWAS Standby Force and the Niger Crisis

The ECOWAS Standby Force completed its full rotation cycle during the term, with Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire serving as the principal lead contributors. Exercise EAGLE RESOLVE 2024, held in Ghana in March 2024, brought together approximately 1,200 personnel from eight Member States and identified interoperability requirements in communications and logistics. The Standby Force maintained the thirty-day readiness posture required by the 1999 Protocol.



The most consequential operational test of the term—the Niger crisis of July–August 2023—resulted in non-deployment. Following the seizure of power in Niamey on 26 July 2023, the Authority issued a seven-day ultimatum backed by explicit authorization for the deployment of the Standby Force if the ultimatum was ignored. The ultimatum expired without compliance. Deployment did not occur. The non-deployment reflected an insufficient consensus among Member States, credible counter-signals from Mali and Burkina Faso, and the reality that international logistical support for a coercive intervention would not be forthcoming. The record is that a public authorization for the use of force was issued and was not executed, and the credibility consequences of that gap have shaped Community decision-making on unconstitutional changes since. The lesson, without recrimination, is that authorization for the use of force should not be issued unless there is a clear operational plan and Member State consensus for their execution. This lesson is available to incoming management.

2.4 Political Mediation and Transitions

2.4.1 Guinea

Guinea's transition from the September 2021 coup was managed through sustained ECOWAS engagement throughout the term. Sanctions and mediation cycles were extended until the transition authorities agreed and executed a credible electoral roadmap. A presidential election was held on 28 December 2025 and parliamentary elections on 31 May 2026. H.E. General Mamadi Doumbouya was sworn in on 17 January 2026. Recorded turnout was 52.87 per cent. On 28 January 2026 the ECOWAS Authority lifted all sanctions against Guinea and reinstated the country's full



participation in Community organs. Guinea was subsequently, at Lungi, approved to join the Presidential Task Force on the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme. The Guinea case shows what sustained political engagement can achieve; it also shows the length of time such engagement requires.

2.4.2 Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau's political trajectory took a sharp downward turn on 26 November 2025 with the seizure of power. The Commission initiated high-level political engagements. A constitutional referendum is scheduled for 30 August 2026 and general elections for 6 December 2026. At Lungi, the Authority appointed Senegal as facilitator, urged the immediate release of the PAIGC opposition leader and other detained political figures, and directed the Commission to continue providing moral and security guarantees to all stakeholders. The situation remains unresolved at the close of the term, and it is a first-order concern for the incoming management.

2.4.3 Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, the Agreement for National Unity between the Government and the All-People's Congress opposition, mediated with ECOWAS support, moved substantively forward during the term. The rapprochement between the Government and the APC eased socio-political tensions, and the statesmanlike gesture by H.E. President Julius Maada Bio in discontinuing charges against former President Ernest Bai Koroma contributed to the restoration of a serene political environment ahead of the 2028 general elections. These developments were welcomed at Community level, with continued monitoring by the International Moral Guarantors and the country's Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion encouraged.

2.4.4 Mano River border disputes

Tensions along the Sierra Leone–Guinea border at Yenga and along the Liberia–Guinea border at Lofa recurred through the term. A Tripartite Communiqué of 16 March 2026 provided a framework for de-escalation. Partial reopening of the Yenga border was recorded, but full withdrawal of Guinean forces from both enclaves had not been effected by the close of the term. Partial progress was recorded and full withdrawal urged; the Commission is to fast-track the technical assessment of current and potential border-friction points in collaboration with the Mano River Union Secretariat, the African Union and UNOWAS.



2.5 Maritime Security

The maritime security dividend achieved by earlier management terms was preserved. The Gulf of Guinea, once among the world's most dangerous waterways, recorded zero confirmed piracy incidents in 2024 and only one incident in the first quarter of 2026 (in Ghana's waters, according to the International Maritime Bureau). The Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea was flagged off in Lagos on 1 June 2026, with participation from Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The West African Police Information System (WAPIS) transferred to full ECOWAS operational control in July 2025, and by end-2025 the system was recording approximately 1.2 million queries annually with EUR 8 million in transitional European Union support. The persistent challenges-illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, oil theft and drug trafficking-remain, but the piracy dividend is real and should be preserved by the incoming management.



2.6 Early Warning, Humanitarian Response and Stabilization

Eight early warning National Centres for the Coordination of Response Mechanism (NCCRMs), with a primary role of alerting on human security challenges, were fully operational by June 2026, out of a planned twelve. The remaining four (Bénin, Cabo Verde, Senegal and Togo) are subject to the pace at which Member States operationalise their national infrastructure. The ECOWAS Humanitarian Relief Fund disbursed USD 23 million cumulatively over 2020–2025, reaching over nine million beneficiaries in 2024 alone, principally in response to flooding. The ECOWAS Regional Stabilisation and Development Fund (FRSD) advanced its Phase II implementation of EUR 53.535 million in Benin, Togo and Guinea-Bissau, with grants for promotion of entrepreneurship among women and youth, investments in social infrastructures in the areas of health and education as well as economic infrastructures (rice processing and brick/pavement making machines). Two peace-support deployments-ECOMIG in The Gambia and ESSMGB in Guinea-Bissau-continued through the term, with exit strategies under development and an inspection mission conducted from 18–26 May 2026. The Commission is to strengthen resource mobilisation for humanitarian response and to facilitate, in collaboration with international partners, the voluntary humanitarian return of migrants in North Africa, particularly Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.





2.7 Counter-Terrorism Diplomacy

The mandate of the Special Envoy on Counterterrorism, H.E. Amb. Baba Kamara, was renewed for a further three years, with the Commission mandated to provide the necessary support. The call on the international community, through the African Union and the UN Security Council, to respond urgently to the needs of terrorism-affected countries through UN-assessed contribution financing under UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023), was reaffirmed. The President of the Commission was mandated to deepen engagement with the AES countries towards establishing a pragmatic security cooperation mechanism based on the shared objective of containing the spread of terrorism in West Africa. This is the point at which the pillar's political and technical dimensions converge on the incoming management's agenda.

2.8 Assessment

The peace and security pillar was the pillar on which the management invested most substantively and on which structural constraints most directly limited outcomes. The Counter-Terrorism Brigade was designed, doctrinally prepared, funding-costed and roadmapped to activation, but the funding gap has constrained the deployment. Political mediation delivered a credible transition in Guinea, sustained engagement in Sierra Leone, and continuous engagement in Guinea-Bissau, but could not prevent the November 2025 seizure of power in Bissau. The Standby Force preserved its readiness posture, but the credibility damage of the Niger non-deployment cannot be dismissed. Maritime security was preserved. Early warning capacity expanded. The pillar's advance was real, but the environment moved faster than the Community's response cycle, and the pillar's forward priorities-Brigade activation, AES engagement on shared counter-terrorism, and the completion of the Guinea-Bissau transition-now devolve to the incoming management.

CHAPTER 3

GOVERNANCE AND RULE OF LAW

3.1 Introduction

The governance and rule of law pillar organises three families of Community work: the promotion of constitutional democracy through election observation, technical assistance to electoral bodies and support for constitutional convergence; the jurisprudence and administrative work of the Community Court of Justice; and the Community's anti-money-laundering and counter-financing of terrorism framework operated through GIABA. This chapter reports performance across all three and closes with the persistent paradox of the term: technical governance capacity expanded even as the political environment deteriorated.



3.2 Constitutional Convergence and Elections

The management deployed nine Election Observation Missions during the term: Nigeria (Presidential and Legislative, February 2023), Sierra Leone (June 2023), Guinea-Bissau (June 2023), The Gambia (Local Government, 2023), Liberia (October–November 2023), Togo (April 2024), Ghana (December 2024), Côte d'Ivoire (October–December 2025), Guinea (December 2025 and May 2026), Cabo Verde (May 2026) and Benin (April 2026). Approximately eight hundred short-term observers, plus long-term observer and core-team members, were deployed cumulatively. A new observation methodology was progressively adopted, including centralised observer accommodation, institutionalisation of the ECOWAS Youth Election Observation Mission (EYEOM), and the mandatory publication of Mission Reports under Article 18 of the 2001 Supplementary Protocol.



Presidential, Legislative and General Elections were conducted peacefully in Guinea, Benin,

Cabo Verde and Côte d'Ivoire. The Government and people of Benin were commended for the successful conduct of the 12 April 2026 Presidential election; H.E. Romuald Wadagni was congratulated on his election, recording 94.05 per cent of votes cast; H.E. Patrice Talon was thanked for his contributions to ECOWAS regional integration. The Government and people of Guinea were commended for the successful conduct of the 28 December 2025 presidential and 31 May 2026 parliamentary elections; H.E. General Mamadi Doumbouya was congratulated on his election. Ongoing preparations for elections in The Gambia (5 December 2026) and the presidential election in Cabo Verde (15 November 2026, with a run-off if required on 29 November) were noted, with the Commission directed to continue supporting Member States in the electoral cycle through 2027.

Technical assistance to Election Management Bodies continued through the term, including support to the biometric voter registration upgrade in The Gambia, electoral legal framework revision in Guinea-Bissau, voter education in Sierra Leone, and electoral dispute resolution training in Ghana. The ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECONEC) convened annually and increasingly functioned as a peer-learning platform. Direct support to domestic observer networks, through partnerships with the West Africa Election Observers Network (WAEON) and equivalent bodies, was maintained though at modest resource levels of USD 50,000–100,000 per country.

The paradox of the term is this. The technical quality of ECOWAS's electoral work improved. But five military coups occurred in the region between 2020 and 2023 (with the last two-Burkina Faso September 2022 and Niger July 2023-within the current term), and one further seizure of power occurred in Guinea-Bissau in November 2025. Contested electoral outcomes, notably in Sierra Leone in June 2023, tested the Community's normative frameworks. The Community can strengthen technical capacity; it cannot substitute for the political will of Member States to consolidate constitutional order. This structural observation, made without recrimination, is essential to any realistic forward planning.

3.3 The Community Court of Justice

The Community Court of Justice discharged its jurisdiction actively through the term. The Court held seventy-nine sessions in 2025, as reported by the President of the Commission in the 2025 Annual Report to the Parliament. The Court advanced its jurisprudence on human rights, on the interpretation of the Revised Treaty and Protocols, and on Community administrative law. The specific case-by-case record is set out in the Annex Volume; salient among the term's decisions were those affirming access to justice for individuals, clarifying the scope of the free-movement

Protocol, and addressing the responsibilities of Member States for internal-order events. Five new Judges of the Community Court of Justice were appointed for the term 2026–2030.



The Court's principal structural constraint remains the enforcement of its judgments. Compliance depends on the good-faith action of Member States and is not backed by direct coercive mechanisms. The record of the term is one of substantial jurisprudential advance offset by uneven enforcement. This is a matter of Community architecture, not of the Court's own performance, and its resolution requires action by the Authority and the Council rather than by the Court itself.

3.4 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (GIABA)

GIABA advanced the region's technical AML/CFT compliance substantially through the term. The second-round mutual evaluation of all fifteen (pre-AES) Member States was completed, and the third-round evaluation procedures were issued in January 2026. Enhanced follow-up reports were completed for Sierra Leone (5th), Guinea (2nd), The Gambia (2nd) and Benin (4th) during 2025. Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal exited the FATF Grey List during the term. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger were admitted as non-ECOWAS members of GIABA following their withdrawal from ECOWAS, preserving the technical AML/CFT cooperation architecture across the wider West African region. Typologies research was published, including on the misuse of legal persons and arrangements.

Technical compliance is not, however, the same as effectiveness. The mutual evaluation record shows technical compliance in the region at approximately fifty-five per cent, with effectiveness scores materially lower. This is a structural feature of the region's political economy-the persistence of large informal-sector economies, cash-based transactions, and the difficulty of enforcing beneficial-ownership transparency in jurisdictions with limited administrative capacity.

3.5 Human Rights

The Community's human rights framework, built on the African Charter, the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the Supplementary Act on Equality of Rights, and the jurisprudence of the Community Court of Justice, continued to be operationalised through monitoring, reporting and civil-society partnerships. The Commission engaged with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the UN human rights machinery, and civil-society partners. The record of the term is one of active engagement in a challenging environment: political and civil liberties came under pressure during transitions in several Member States; gender-based violence remained at high prevalence rates across the region; the situation of migrants in North Africa, in particular in Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, deteriorated. The Commission is to work, in collaboration with international partners, to facilitate the voluntary humanitarian return of migrants.

3.6 Assessment

Technical governance capacity across the pillar strengthened. The election-observation methodology matured; the Court advanced its jurisprudence; the GIABA framework became more comprehensive. At the same time, the pillar's outcomes-constitutional stability, respect for judgments, and effectiveness of AML/CFT-did not track the improvements in technical capacity. The lesson of the pillar, offered to the incoming management, is that technical capacity is necessary but not sufficient. Governance outcomes depend on the political and economic environment of Member States, and the Community's ability to shape those environments is limited. What the Community can do is document, mediate, and continue to support. What it cannot do is substitute for political will. The pillar's forward priorities-the Guinea-Bissau transition, support to the electoral cycle through 2027, deepening technical AML/CFT cooperation, and the strengthening of Community Court jurisprudence-are on the record and available to the incoming management.

CHAPTER 4

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND INTERCONNECTIVITY

4.1 Introduction

Economic integration remains ECOWAS's founding mandate. The 2022–2026 term recorded consolidation in trade infrastructure, decisive Authority direction on the single currency programme, structural preservation of the free-movement architecture, and important advances in regional infrastructure. It also recorded the persistent gap between the Community's legal framework and its implementation reality. This chapter reports the record across four sub-domains: trade and customs union; monetary integration; free movement of persons; and regional infrastructure and connectivity.



4.2 Trade and the Customs Union

The ECOWAS Common External Tariff, adopted in January 2015, remained operational across all Member States throughout the term. Implementation quality varied. Larger customs administrations-Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire-applied the CET consistently; smaller administrations experienced episodic reversion to national tariff schedules where staff training or systems maintenance was interrupted. Selective exemption regimes granted by individual Member States, particularly on foodstuffs and vehicles, continued to erode uniformity. The proliferation of bilateral trade agreements by individual Member States was formally identified as a risk to the ECOWAS Customs Union at the 69th Ordinary Session, with Member States called upon to avoid concluding agreements incompatible with their Revised Treaty obligations. The Commission is to coordinate common Community positions on international negotiations with third parties.

The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) continued to operate as the principal instrument of intra-regional trade preference. Approximately 15,000 Certificates of Origin were issued annually across the Community, a level materially below the scale of actual intra-regional trade estimated at USD 150 billion per year—a persistent under-utilisation attributable to trader unfamiliarity, procedural complexity and inconsistent border-post recognition. The ECOWAS Single Window initiative became operational in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal by 2025, with reported reductions in trade-processing times of thirty to forty per cent in those jurisdictions. Seven Member States had not yet operationalised single-window platforms by the close of the term.




SIGMAT (Système Informatique de Gestion des Marchandises en Transit), the customs-transit management system, was deployed in all Member States except Guinea-Bissau. Non-tariff-barrier elimination campaigns temporarily reduced the number of unauthorised checkpoints along regional corridors from an estimated three hundred to two hundred; the checkpoints typically re-established themselves within months of campaign attention moving elsewhere. The Commission is to continue its work with Member States on reducing non-tariff barriers, protecting the ETLS and supporting Customs Union domestication.

4.3 The Single Currency (ECO)

The single currency programme received decisive Community direction at the 69th Ordinary Session. Paragraph 13 of the Final Communiqué reaffirms the commitment to a 2027 launch of the ECO as a key instrument for deepening regional economic integration. The launch will commence with countries meeting the established convergence criteria; support will be provided to countries not yet ready, facilitating their subsequent accession. This is a material shift from the previous premise of simultaneous launch: it accepts that phased introduction with converged participants first is now the operative approach.

High-level consultations with the Governors of the Central Banks of Member States continued, and the name 'ECO' was registered with the African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI). The Republic of Guinea's request to join the Presidential Task Force on the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme was approved. The Commission was directed to convene a meeting of the Presidential Task Force prior to the December 2026 Ordinary Summit, in collaboration with the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, who is the only remaining serving member of the Task Force. The Commission was further directed, in collaboration with the West African Monetary Agency, to intensify consultations with Central Bank Governors to formulate consensual proposals on outstanding issues for consideration by the Task Force. The Commission was also directed to register the ECO as a trademark of the ECOWAS single currency with other relevant regional and international intellectual property bodies.



The convergence position across Member States at the close of the term remains materially removed from the threshold criteria on a strict-compliance basis. Regional inflation of 16.8 per cent in 2025-the criterion is five per cent or below-was materially exceeded by all but two Member States. Fiscal deficits in excess of four per cent of GDP were recorded in the majority of Member States. According to the ECOWAS-WAMA Macroeconomic Convergence Report for 2024 (July 2025), nine Member States met the gross external reserves criterion in 2024, up from eight in 2023, and eleven met the central bank financing criterion, up from ten. Two Member States-Benin and Cabo Verde-met all four primary criteria simultaneously in 2024, up from Cabo Verde alone in 2023, and six Member States met at least three of the four primary criteria, up from three in 2023, while one Member State met none of the four in either year.

On the two secondary criteria, six Member States met both in 2024, with ten meeting the exchange-rate variation target and eight meeting the public debt target. Preliminary projections for 2025 indicated four Member States achieving full compliance with the primary criteria and eight meeting at least three. It is against this backdrop that the phased-launch decision must be read: it is a pragmatic accommodation of reality that preserves the 2027 target while accepting differentiation. The West African Monetary Institute continued technical preparation through the term: payment-systems architecture, monetary-policy frameworks, banking-supervision standards, and currency-conversion logistics. A 2024 WAMI report assessed the currency-conversion implementation period at eighteen to twenty-four months from political decision to complete conversion, with costs exceeding USD 2 billion. The technical work is well advanced. The political and macroeconomic conditions remain the binding constraint. This is the single largest policy question the incoming management must resolve in its first year.

4.4 Free Movement of Persons

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment remains, in the words of the Authority at Lungi, 'a fundamental pillar of regional integration and one of the Community's most significant achievements.' Commitment to preserving the gains of regional integration, facilitating the movement of persons and goods, and promoting cross-border trade and economic cooperation was reaffirmed. Approximately forty-five million ECOWAS Biometric Identity Cards were issued cumulatively across Member States by the close of the term, providing the technical infrastructure for identity-based mobility.





The gap between the legal architecture and lived experience narrowed but did not close. Administrative harassment at internal borders continued; informal fees ('processing charges') persisted; incidents of violations were recorded in several Member States during periods of economic stress. The Authority reaffirmed at Lungi that ongoing engagements with the AES States should help safeguard regional mobility, economic exchanges, and people-to-people relations across West Africa—recognising that free movement is not only a Community principle but a shared regional interest that transcends the current membership configuration.

The ongoing xenophobic attacks in South Africa targeting people of African descent, particularly West African citizens, were condemned, with the South African authorities urged to address the situation and find a permanent solution. Ghana's decision to table the matter at the forthcoming AU Assembly received Community support. This external dimension of free movement is a matter the incoming management will need to continue to pursue.

4.5 Regional Infrastructure and Connectivity

The Authority at Lungi directed the Commission to urgently develop a comprehensive portfolio of strategic regional infrastructure projects that are investment-ready and capable of attracting financing from regional and international development finance institutions, sovereign wealth funds, private investors, and other partners. The Commission is to prioritise projects in transport, energy, digital connectivity, and water infrastructure and to report annually on progress in preparation, financing, and implementation. This is a direct mandate to translate strategic frameworks into project pipelines.

4.5.1 Energy: the African Atlantic Gas Pipeline

The Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) relating to the African Atlantic Gas Pipeline (AAGP) was signed, with Community support affirmed for the project as a strategic initiative to strengthen regional energy security, industrialisation, economic integration and sustainable development in West Africa. Cooperation between ECOWAS Member States and the Kingdom of Morocco advanced substantively. The AAGP is now the largest regional infrastructure undertaking in Community history, and its advancement over the coming years will be a principal test of the region's ability to convert political consensus into project execution.

4.5.2 Air transport

Efforts to reduce the cost of air transport in West Africa were sustained; Côte d'Ivoire was the only Member State to have removed the applicable taxes during the term. Other Member States were directed to expedite national processes, including cross-sectoral consultations, revision of related tax laws, sensitisation of stakeholders and airport service providers, and compliance with the Authority Decision on taxes on air transport and reduction of passenger service and security charges. The Regional Air Transport Economic Oversight Committee was successfully created by ECOWAS, and the Authority called on EBID, the AfDB, Afreximbank and other partners to collaborate with the Commission in raising multilateral funding for air transport infrastructure.

4.5.3 Digital transformation

The Revised Supplementary Act on the Protection of Personal Data in the ECOWAS Region was adopted, along with Council instruments on open data, electronic communications, digital governance, roaming and cybersecurity. The Regional Cybersecurity Coordination Mechanism was established. Taken together, these instruments constitute the most substantial expansion of the Community's digital regulatory architecture in a decade, and their operationalisation is a first-order task for the incoming Commissioner for Infrastructure, Energy and Digitalisation.

4.6 Private Sector Development

The West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP) continued in design and pilot implementation through the term, with financing for full execution constrained. The regional business environment continued to reflect the fundamentals: access to finance at fifteen to twenty per cent of GDP (approximately half the Sub-Saharan African average); interest rates for small and medium enterprises in the twenty-five to thirty-five per cent range; and a business climate that remained challenging in international comparative assessments. Model investment codes were adopted in

five Member States, with reported reductions in investment-approval timelines from six to twelve months down to thirty to forty-five days.

At Lungi, the Chairman of the ECOWAS Business Council, Alhaji Aliko Dangote, addressed the Authority alongside the President of the Commission and the UN Deputy Secretary-General, marking the growing institutional weight of the private-sector voice in Community deliberations. Deepening the Community's engagement with regional private capital is an item for the incoming management.

4.7 Food Security

Food and nutrition conditions in parts of the region and the impact of rising fertiliser prices on agricultural productivity remained a Community concern; measures have been adopted by Member States and Community Institutions to mitigate the fertiliser crisis and strengthen regional food security mechanisms advanced. Progress on the ECOWAS Rice Agenda was welcomed and faster implementation of the Regional Rice Roadmap urged, as part of efforts to reduce dependence on imports and achieve food sovereignty. The 3.7 million litres of milk produced annually under the regional livestock programme and the 1,384,532 school meals delivered provide two concrete indicators of programme reach.



4.8 Assessment

Economic integration advanced substantively along several fronts-the ECO decision, the AAGP IGA, the digital transformation instruments, and the CET's continued operation-while lagging materially on others: non-tariff barrier elimination, ETLS utilisation, convergence for the single currency, and the harmonised air-transport tax reform. The pillar's principal structural constraint is the gap between the Community's legal frameworks and their implementation at Member State level. That gap can only be closed through sustained engagement with Member State administrations and through the mobilisation of investment finance to translate legal instruments into on-the-ground reality. The incoming management inherits an ambitious agenda-the ECO 2027 phased launch, the AAGP execution, the operationalisation of the digital architecture, and the delivery of the strategic infrastructure portfolio.

CHAPTER 5

TRANSFORMATION, INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL INCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter merges the two pillars of the Vision 20250 - chapters (transformation, inclusive and sustainable development and social inclusion). They are treated together here because, in the reality of Community programming, transformation and inclusion are inseparable: infrastructure without inclusion produces jobless growth; inclusion without transformation reproduces poverty. The chapter reports across four sub-domains: health; education, youth and jobs; gender and social inclusion; and humanitarian response and displacement.

5.2 Health

The West African Health Organization (WAHO) advanced regional health cooperation through the term. The ECOWAS One Health Strategy 2025–2029 and its associated Governance Manual were developed, positioning the Community to respond to the growing convergence of human, animal and environmental health threats. Nursing and midwifery curricula were harmonised at a technical meeting in Cotonou in February 2026. The National Health Management Information System (NHMIS) data-automation initiative advanced across The Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo. Vaccination programmes continued, and the response to endemic threats (cholera, meningitis, seasonal outbreaks) was coordinated through the Regional Coordinating Centre.

The pillar's principal structural constraint became visible in the second half of the term. The January 2025 termination of most USAID programming produced a material contraction of external health financing. Independent modelling estimated approximately 1,000 additional maternal deaths across six vulnerable West and Central African countries in 2025 as a direct consequence of the USAID withdrawal; Nigeria alone was estimated to have lost over USD 600 million in health funding, or approximately one-fifth of its annual health budget. The Director General of WAHO drew Council's attention on the need for domestic resource mobilisation for health and for the exploration of ring-fenced health taxes and health-sector innovative financing. The health financing gap-USAID withdrawal, reductions in bilateral partner commitments, insufficient domestic resource mobilisation- is a first-order priority for the incoming Commissioner for Human Development and Social Affairs.



5.3 Education, Youth and Jobs

The ECOWAS Regional Stabilisation and Development Fund (FRSD) implemented Phase II across Benin, Togo and Guinea-Bissau, with EUR 53.5 million programmed. Cumulative outcomes include 1,850 youth trained with a placement rate of 78 per cent, 47 community infrastructure projects delivered, and enterprise-development support for approximately 150 small and medium businesses. Cumulatively across FRSD and related programmes, 9,120 youth were trained during the term and approximately 5,025 permanent jobs were reported. The 1,384,532 school meals delivered under the regional school feeding programme in 2025 alone provide one indicator of the reach of complementary regional food-security programming into education and social-protection outcomes.

The regional demographic reality—approximately sixty per cent of the population under twenty-five years of age, and youth unemployment at levels well in excess of urban wage-employment absorption capacity—renders these programmes materially insufficient to the scale of the challenge. The Community's youth-and-jobs response requires an order-of-magnitude expansion. This is a strategic priority for the incoming management and cannot be delivered through Community Levy financing alone; it requires the mobilisation of Member State fiscal space, private capital, and development-partner co-financing at scale.





5.4 Gender and Social Inclusion

The Presidential Declaration on Advancing Gender Parity in Political Representation in ECOWAS Member States was adopted as a flagship legacy initiative of the ECOWAS Golden Jubilee celebrations. As at December 2025, women held only 19.4 per cent of lower-house parliamentary seats across the region; the Declaration sets the aspirational target of achieving parliamentary parity by 2035 in political representation in parliaments across the ECOWAS region . Commitment to promoting women's participation in political and public life was reaffirmed, with Member States encouraged to strengthen measures that increase women's representation in decision-making institutions. This is a substantive commitment; its implementation will depend on Member State legislative action, party-political reform, and civic mobilisation over the coming decade.

Cumulatively, across the term's inclusion programming, over fifty women in rural communities in Liberia and Sierra Leone were supported through livelihood and enterprise programmes documented in the 2026 mid-term reporting; broader gender-and-empowerment initiatives were implemented through the Department of Human Development and Social Affairs. Gender-based violence prevalence remained at levels of thirty to forty per cent across the region, according to available Community and Member State surveys; the Community's normative frameworks remain robust, but the implementation and enforcement gaps are wide.



5.5 Humanitarian Response and Displacement

The Community's humanitarian response during the term is documented in Chapter 2. Additional to the peace-and-security dimension, the pillar recorded USD 7.84 million in direct humanitarian assistance and social protection through partner programmes, principally in Benin, Togo, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The Authority at Lungi noted with serious concern the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the region as a consequence of conflict, terrorism, displacement, food insecurity and climate-related disasters, and the particularly debilitating impacts on women and children, including child recruitment, trafficking and exploitation, disrupted education, and limited access to shelter, healthcare and livelihoods. The Commission was directed to strengthen resource mobilisation to address these pressing issues, strengthen coordination among Member States to facilitate safe education in emergencies, and work with international partners to facilitate the voluntary humanitarian return of migrants in North Africa.



5.6 Climate and Environment

Climate-related shocks intensified during the term. Flooding in the Lake Chad Basin, the Niger Basin and coastal West Africa produced repeated large-scale displacement. The ECOWAS Humanitarian Relief Fund reached over nine million beneficiaries in 2024 alone, principally in response to flooding. The Community's Environmental Policy and its climate-change adaptation framework continued to be operationalised, though at levels materially below the scale of the challenge. The intersection of climate, food security, and displacement is now a structural feature of the region's development environment.



5.7 Golden Jubilee (ECOWAS@50) Legacy Instruments

The 2022–2026 term coincided with the Community's Golden Jubilee. The Jubilee was launched in Accra on 22 April 2025 under the patronage of H.E. President John Dramani Mahama. Year-long commemorations were held across capitals under the theme 'Stronger Together, for a Brighter Future.' At the Lungi Special Summit, building on the legacy of fifty years of regional integration and the commitments made during the ECOWAS 50th Anniversary celebration in Lagos, the Authority of Heads of State and Government signed the Declaration of Commitment to the Compact of the Future - reaffirming their collective resolve to consolidate regional unity, secure lasting peace, accelerate shared and sustainable development, and ensure that the next fifty years of our Community are defined by tangible results, inclusive prosperity, and a strengthened voice for West Africa on the global stage.

The Government of the People's Republic of China constructed and donated the new ECOWAS Headquarters in Abuja - a landmark contribution and enduring symbol of the strategic partnership between ECOWAS and China, and a tangible legacy of the term.



5.8 Assessment

The transformation and inclusion pillar was the pillar most exposed to external financing shocks. The USAID withdrawal produced a material contraction in health financing that no Community mechanism can rapidly replace. Youth-and-jobs programming reached tens of thousands, but the scale of the demographic challenge remains at multiples above programme reach. Gender-parity commitments were substantively strengthened at the level of Authority declaration but require legislative and civic follow-through at Member State level. The Golden Jubilee produced tangible legacy instruments - the Compact, the Gender Parity Declaration, the new Headquarters. The pillar's forward priorities-health-financing sustainability, the scaling of youth-and-jobs programming, the operationalisation of the Gender Parity Declaration, and the strengthening of climate-humanitarian nexus programming-are on the record and available to the incoming management.

PART



Institutional Performance

CHAPTER 6

FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

6.1 Introduction

This chapter consolidates the financial and human resources performance of the Community over the 2022–2026 term. Following the guidance of the Authority at Lungi and the Council of Ministers, and consistent with the honest-record principle of this Compendium, the chapter presents the record as it stands - including the material shortfalls in Community Levy mobilisation, the accumulated arrears, the vacancy position, and the impact of the AES withdrawal on both.

6.2 Financial Position at 15 June 2026

The Community's 2026 approved budget stood at UA 411,724,082. Income received as at 15 June 2026 amounted to UA 149,756,098, representing 36.4 per cent of the approved budget—a material improvement over the 23.5 per cent recorded in the same period of 2025, attributable largely to the settlement of 2025 outstanding Community Levy arrears by Nigeria. Actual expenditure at the reporting date stood at UA 70,138,885, or 17.0 per cent of the approved budget. Consolidated operational expenditure amounted to UA 33,868,685 against an approved UA 161,545,551, an execution rate of approximately twenty-one per cent (a sixty-eight per cent year-on-year improvement in operational execution). Budget execution ranged across institutions from 13.1 per cent at the Commission to 42.7 per cent at the highest-executing institution. The Community's cash position stood at UA 26,879,747 at 15 June 2026, up from UA 15,218,095 at the start of the year, and all obligations falling due were met.

Table 6.1 2026 Budget position at 15 June 2026 (UA)

Item	Amount (UA)	% of Budget	
Approved Budget 2026	411,724,082	100.0%	-
Income received (to 15 June)	149,756,098	36.4%	23.5% same period 2025
Actual expenditure (to 15 June)	70,138,885	17.0%	-
Cash Position (15 June)	26,879,747	-	UA 15,218,095 (opening)
Consolidated operational spend	33,868,685	~21% of approved ops	68% YoY increase

6.3 Community Levy: Assessed, Received, Outstanding

The Community Levy is the principal instrument of Community financing, funding between seventy-five and ninety per cent of the ECOWAS budget under the 0.5 per cent extra-community import Protocol authorised by Article 72 of the Revised Treaty. Since inception in July 2003, the cumulative Community Levy assessed stands at UA 2,772,066,220. As at 15 June 2026, outstanding arrears totalled UA 595,690,691-that is, 21.5 per cent of all Community Levy ever assessed remains unpaid. Five Member States-Nigeria, Guinea, Benin, Cabo Verde and Côte d'Ivoire-account for approximately 88.5 per cent of the outstanding balance. Community Levy disbursements to Institutions and Agencies through 15 June 2026 amounted to UA 84.43 million, or 34 per cent of the 2026 approved budget.

A structural context is essential to reading these figures. The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger produced a reduction of approximately twenty per cent in the Community Levy base. Nigeria's December 2024 payment of USD 54 million was its first one-hundred-per-cent Levy remittance in nineteen years, and it made a further payment of USD 100.3 million during 2026. These two payments, together, substantially explain the improvement in the year-on-year receipt position. The underlying weakness of Levy mobilisation, however, has not been resolved. The 69th Ordinary Session formally recorded concern about persistent Community Levy arrears and urged Member States to fully honour their financial obligations. The Commission is to strengthen its engagement with Member States on implementing the Community Levy Protocol and to develop measures ensuring sustainable financing.

Table 6.2 Community Levy - cumulative position since inception

Item	Amount (UA)	Percentage
Cumulative Community Levy assessed (July 2003 – 15 June 2026)	2,772,066,220	100.0%
Levy received	2,176,375,529	78.5%
Levy outstanding (arrears)	595,690,691	21.5%
Share of arrears held by top five Member States	~527,186,000	88.5% of arrears

6.4 Development Partner Contributions and the EU Pillar Assessment

Development partner grants to the Community remained volatile throughout the term. Grants peaked in 2024 at approximately UA 32.2 million before contracting to approximately UA 23.4 million in 2025—a twenty-seven per cent decline in the space of a year, driven principally by the January 2025 termination of most USAID programming. Aggregate grant support therefore declined by more than the AES withdrawal's Community Levy impact in the second half of the term. The Community was thus simultaneously exposed to both a base contraction (from AES departure) and an external contraction (from USAID and partner reprioritisation).

The EU Pillar Assessment—the audit process which, once passed, permits ECOWAS to receive EU budget support and to manage EU-funded programmes under indirect management—remained in the preparation phase throughout the term. A benchmarking mission to the Southern African Development Community was conducted in November 2024; pre-audit sessions were held with the designated EU Pillar Champions across the Commission and EBID; the EU-funded Institutional Support to ECOWAS programme continued to accompany preparation across nine pillar areas. The formal assessment had not been undertaken by the close of the term. Completing the assessment is a first-order priority for the incoming management, given the fiscal implications of continued preparation-only status.

6.5 Human Resources Position at 15 June 2026

At 15 June 2026, 448 positions in the Community's approved organogram remained vacant. During 2026, ninety-four positions were recruited between 1 January and 10 June; sixteen managerial positions were interviewed between 16 June and 6 July; and eighteen further managerial positions—vacated by the withdrawal of AES-national staff—were under interview by the independent HR agency Deloitte NG, with completion scheduled for end-July 2026. Five Judges and nine other statutory appointees were successfully recruited during the term. The contract-to-permanent conversion exercise, mandated by the 95th Council, was completed with the final eleven contract staff converted—ending the conversion cycle in its current form.

The Council at Freetown accepted the AFC recommendation and directed that all new recruitment (positions not yet advertised) be placed on hold for the incoming management, pending completion of an organogram right-sizing exercise. The organogram assessment is being conducted independently by Development Aid Limited, with its report to be tabled for the incoming Commission. This is a deliberate and prudent measure: it preserves the incoming management's freedom of manoeuvre on the shape and size of the Commission workforce, and it prevents the accumulation of commitments that the incoming President cannot revisit.

Table 6.3 Human Resources Positions as at 15 June 2026

Item	Count	Notes
Approved positions (organogram)	-	Under review
Vacant positions as at 15 June 2026	448	Recruitment on hold
Recruited 1 Jan – 10 June 2026	94	Concluded
Managerial positions interviewed 16 June – 6 July	16	Ongoing
AES-vacated managerial positions under interview (Deloitte NG)	18	End-July target
Judges and Statutory Appointees recruited during the term	14	5 Judges + 9 others
Contract-to-permanent conversions completed	11	Final cohort

The Auditor General observed that the current workforce is 'not yet positioned to deliver the Vision 2050 mandate at full strength.' The observation captures the essential HR position that the incoming management inherits: an organisation whose approved establishment has never been fully staffed, whose workforce was materially depleted by the AES withdrawal (particularly at senior grades P5 and above), and whose forward staffing depends on decisions about the shape and scale of the Commission that the incoming President must take.



6.6 Structural Assessment

The Community's financial and human-resources position at the close of the term is one of continuity under strain. Levy mobilisation improved materially in 2026 relative to 2025, principally through Nigeria's exceptional payments; but the underlying arrears position of UA 595.69 million and the loss of the AES contribution base mean that the Community's revenue base is not yet on a sustainable trajectory. Human resources are materially below the approved establishment, and the deliberate recruitment hold preserves the incoming management's decision space at the cost of continued operational stretch. Development-partner support contracted, in some cases sharply, with the USAID withdrawal producing effects still working their way through the health and humanitarian pipelines.

Three structural priorities emerge for the incoming management. First, the Community Levy Protocol requires renewed political engagement, both to reduce accumulated arrears and to prevent their reaccumulation.

The Authority's directive at Lungi to 'develop measures to ensure sustainable financing' invites a substantive rethinking of the Levy's operational modalities, not merely a stronger reminder to Member States. Second, the EU Pillar Assessment must be completed. The continued preparation-only status is a fiscal risk. Third, the organogram right-sizing exercise must be concluded, and its recommendations implemented with the fiscal envelope in mind. A right-sized organogram, fully staffed within a sustainable resource base, will deliver more than the current under-staffed organogram against an unattainable establishment target.

The record is one of resilience under strain, not of crisis. Cash flow was maintained; all obligations were met when due; statutory appointments were completed; and the Community's core operations continued through the term. The task for the incoming management is to convert this resilience into sustainability.

PART IV



**Lessons and
Forward Agenda**

CHAPTER 7

LESSONS LEARNED

7.1 Introduction

This chapter distils six lessons from the 2022–2026 term. They are offered without recrimination and without self-congratulation, as candid observations that may be of use to the incoming management. They are drawn from the record documented in the preceding chapters and from the deliberations of the statutory organs across the term.

7.2 Lesson One: Technical capacity is necessary but not sufficient.

Across every pillar—governance, security, integration, transformation, the Community’s technical capacity strengthened over the term. Election observation methodology matured. Counter-terrorism doctrine advanced. Trade infrastructure consolidated. AML/CFT compliance frameworks deepened. Digital governance instruments were adopted. Yet the outcomes of the pillar did not track the improvements in technical capacity in linear fashion. Five military coups occurred in the wider region between 2020 and 2023; one further seizure of power occurred in Guinea-Bissau in November 2025. Sahel terrorism expanded despite counter-terrorism investments. Convergence for the single currency was not achieved. The lesson is that technical capacity is necessary but not sufficient; governance outcomes depend on the political and economic environment of Member States. The incoming management should invest in both technical capacity and the political relationships through which that capacity translates into outcomes.

7.3 Lesson Two: Financial sustainability cannot rest on the Community Levy alone.

The Community Levy is the constitutional cornerstone of Community financing. But the four-year record shows that Levy mobilisation is chronically vulnerable to Member State fiscal cycles, political prioritisation, and now, following the AES withdrawal, to the shrinkage of the assessment base. UA 595.69 million in arrears at the close of the term is not an accident of the moment; it is a structural feature of the Community’s financing model. The incoming management’s mandate from the Authority at Lungi to “develop measures to ensure sustainable financing” invites a fundamental review of the Community’s revenue base, its debt-management practices, its endowment options, and its access to development-partner support—the completion of the EU Pillar Assessment being a first-order priority in this last respect.

7.4 Lesson Three: Authorisations for the use of force should be tied to operational readiness.

The credibility damage from the non-execution of the Standby Force authorisation in the Niger crisis of July–August 2023 has shaped Community decision-making since. The lesson, offered without recrimination, is that authorisations for the use of force should not be issued unless there is a clear operational plan and Member State consensus for their execution. The incoming management's counter-terrorism Brigade activation-for which July 2027 is the target for full operational capability-should build on this lesson, ensuring that the political, financial and logistical conditions for deployment are secured before deployment decisions are announced.

7.5 Lesson Four: The gap between Community law and Member State practice remains the principal implementation constraint.

Across free movement, the CET, ETLS utilisation, the ECOWAS Passport, harmonised air-transport taxation, and the enforcement of Community Court judgments, the record is one of a Community whose legal architecture exceeds the practical compliance of its Member States. The Community's response has been to expand technical assistance, to convene peer-learning platforms, and to issue Authority directives. These are appropriate instruments, but they cannot substitute for the direct engagement between the Community and Member State administrations-the customs officers, the border-post commanders, the electoral administrators, the tax officials-whose day-to-day decisions determine implementation. The incoming management should consider whether the balance of the Commission's resource allocation between headquarters programming and Member State implementation support requires adjustment.

7.6 Lesson Five: External financing dependence is a strategic vulnerability

The USAID withdrawal in January 2025 exposed the Community's exposure to sudden shifts in external financing. Independent estimates of one thousand additional maternal deaths across six vulnerable West and Central African countries, and Nigeria's loss of over USD 600 million in health funding, together illustrate how quickly a change in external policy can affect community outcomes. The lesson is not that the community should reduce its engagement with external partners - the opposite is true - but that it should diversify its partner base, deepen its domestic resource-mobilisation capacity, and negotiate partnership modalities that provide for orderly transitions. This applies particularly to the health sector, where the incoming Commissioner for Human Development and Social Affairs will inherit a challenging financing environment.

7.7 Lesson Six: Institutional shocks require institutional responses.

The AES withdrawal was the most consequential institutional shock in the Community's fifty-year history.

The management's response-the Contingency Plan, the appointment of the Chief Negotiator, the establishment of the Negotiation Secretariat and Technical Support Teams, the two-stage negotiating framework, the preservation of technical AML/CFT cooperation through GIABA's admission of the three States as non-ECOWAS members-preserved the substance of Community cooperation while accepting the political reality of separation. The subsequent decision at the 69th Ordinary Session to conduct future negotiations exclusively as a unified block reinforces this institutional response. The lesson, offered to the incoming management, is that institutional shocks require institutional responses: mechanisms, mandates, teams, and negotiating architectures, not merely political statements. The incoming management inherits an operating architecture for AES engagement that it should continue to use.

7.8 Summary

These six lessons do not exhaust what can be learned from the term. They are offered as the observations most likely to be of practical use to the incoming management as it takes office on 1 September 2026. The full evidence for each is set out in the preceding chapters and in the Annex Volume.

CHAPTER 8

FORWARD AGENDA FOR THE INCOMING MANAGEMENT (2026–2030)

8.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out six priorities for the incoming management for its first twelve to eighteen months in office. The priorities are derived directly from the decisions of the Authority at its 69th Ordinary Session at Lungi on 19 July 2026, the decisions of the 96th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, the Final Report of the 39th Administration and Finance Committee, and the record documented in the preceding chapters of this Compendium. Each priority is stated at a strategic level; the detailed operational sub-tasks are set out in the Annex Volume, together with the specific Authority Decision references. The priorities are ordered by first-year decision urgency; all six are consequential and will require sustained management attention throughout the term.

8.2 The Six Priorities

PRIORITY ONE - Complete the ECOWAS–AES Structured Engagement

The Authority at Lungi extended the mandate of Chief Negotiator H.E. Dr. Lansana Kouyaté to December 2026 and reaffirmed that negotiations with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger will proceed exclusively as a unified block. Member States are to refrain from separate bilateral agreements that threaten ECOWAS cohesion.

The first-order task is to conclude the General Framework Agreement (Stage 1) with entry into force in the fourth quarter of 2026, and to open Stage 2 (the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement) covering economic integration, counterterrorism, border management, and eventual re-engagement pathways. The incoming management should continue the Negotiation Secretariat Team and Technical Support Team architecture that is already operational and preserve the bilateral engagement modality that has produced initial positive contacts.

The Authority further directed at Lungi that the President of the Commission deepen engagement with the AES countries towards establishing a pragmatic security cooperation mechanism based on the shared objective of containing the spread of terrorism in West Africa. This is a workstream to be advanced in parallel with the GFA and CCA negotiations.

PRIORITY TWO - Deliver the phased launch of the ECO in 2027

The Authority at Lungi reaffirmed the 2027 launch of the ECO with converged Member States first and directed the Commission to take all necessary steps to convene a meeting of the Presidential Task Force on the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme prior to the December 2026 Ordinary Summit, in collaboration with the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, the only remaining serving member of the Task Force. The Republic of Guinea's request to join the Task Force was approved.

The incoming management inherits three concrete tasks: convening the Task Force meeting before December 2026; formulating consensual proposals through the West African Monetary Agency on the outstanding issues (the future central bank, decision rules, participation by CFA-franc-zone countries); and completing the registration of the ECO name with other regional and international intellectual property bodies beyond the OAPI. The technical work at WAMI on payment systems, currency design and conversion logistics is substantially complete; the political and macroeconomic conditions for launch are the binding constraint.

PRIORITY THREE - Secure sustainable Community financing

The Authority at Lungi expressed concern about persistent Community Levy arrears (UA 595.69 million, 21.5 per cent of cumulative assessed) and directed the Commission to strengthen its engagement with Member States on implementing the Community Levy Protocol and to develop measures to ensure sustainable financing for Community programmes and institutions.

The incoming management should: (i) present to the Council of Ministers, within its first six months, a comprehensive financing strategy addressing accumulated arrears, the assessment methodology in the post-AES configuration, and options for revenue diversification; (ii) complete the EU Pillar Assessment, which has remained in the preparation phase throughout the term, to open access to EU budget support and indirect management of EU-funded programmes; and (iii) accelerate the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Investment Fund and other alternative financing instruments identified in the Community Strategic Framework.

PRIORITY FOUR - Activate the Counter-Terrorism Brigade to full operational capability by July 2027

The Authority at Lungi endorsed the Revised Roadmap for the activation of the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Brigade, with phased implementation timelines towards achieving full operational capability by July 2027. The Commission is directed to facilitate consultations between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria to agree on the location of the Headquarters of the Force.

The annual funding requirement is USD 481,459,835. As at May 2026, only five Member States had made the Community Levy arrears payments earmarked for the Brigade. The Authority directed the President of the Commission to engage relevant Member States to expedite the remittance of outstanding Community Levy arrears before the end of 2026. The incoming management's first-order task is to convert the pledges into actual contributions and to secure the deployment framework-headquarters location, force composition, rules of engagement, and coordination arrangements with Member State forces already engaged in counter-terrorism operations.

PRIORITY FIVE - Deliver an investment-ready regional infrastructure portfolio

The Authority at Lungi directed the Commission to urgently develop a comprehensive portfolio of strategic regional infrastructure projects that are investment-ready and capable of attracting financing from regional and international development finance institutions, sovereign wealth funds, private investors, and other partners. Priority sectors are transport, energy, digital connectivity, and water infrastructure. The Commission is to report annually on progress in project preparation, financing, and implementation.

The first major project of this portfolio is the African Atlantic Gas Pipeline, for which the Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed with the Kingdom of Morocco. Additional priorities include the completion of the West African Power Pool interconnections, the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor, and the Community's digital connectivity backbone. The incoming Commissioner for Infrastructure, Energy and Digitalisation will need to work closely with EBID, the African Development Bank, Afreximbank, and the private sector to convert these projects into financeable transactions.

PRIORITY SIX - Complete the organogram right-sizing and normalise the workforce

The 96th Council directed that all new recruitment (positions not yet advertised) be placed on hold for the incoming management, pending completion of the independent organogram review by Development Aid Limited. Four hundred and forty-eight positions were vacant at 15 June 2026. Eighteen managerial positions vacated by the AES withdrawal were under interview through the independent HR agency.

The incoming management's task is to receive the organogram review, make the strategic decisions on establishment size and structure, and then normalise recruitment against the new establishment within the financing envelope determined under Priority Three. This exercise should conclude within the first twelve months. Continued operational stretch, while sustainable in the short term, is not sustainable through the full 2026–2030 term.

8.3 Cross-cutting priorities

In addition to the six numbered priorities, three cross-cutting matters require sustained attention across the term:

- **Operationalisation of the Golden Jubilee legacy instruments:** The Compact for the Future of Regional Integration, the Presidential Declaration on Advancing Gender Parity, and the adoption of the new Headquarters in Abuja are legacy commitments that require sustained follow-through, particularly at Member State level.
- **Support to the electoral cycle 2026–2027:** General elections in The Gambia (5 December 2026), a presidential election in Cabo Verde (November 2026), and the Guinea-Bissau constitutional referendum (30 August 2026) and general elections (6 December 2026) will require sustained ECOWAS accompaniment through the incoming management's first six months.
- **Preservation and deepening of the free-movement architecture:** The Authority at Lungi reaffirmed the Protocol on Free Movement as one of the Community's most significant achievements and directed that engagement with the AES States should safeguard regional mobility. Preserving free movement in practice, not merely in law, is a Community priority that will require continuous attention.

8.4 Sequencing

The priorities are consequential and interconnected. Priority One (AES engagement) has a fourth-quarter 2026 milestone. Priority Two (ECO Task Force convening) has a pre-December 2026 milestone. Priority Three (financing strategy) should be presented to the Council within the first six months. Priority Four (Brigade activation) has a July 2027 target. Priority Five (infrastructure portfolio) requires annual reporting. Priority Six (organogram) requires resolution within the first twelve months. The recommended sequencing is therefore concurrent, not sequential: each priority requires immediate engagement from the outset of the term, with the milestones providing the discipline of externally set deadlines.

CONCLUSION

The 2022–2026 management term unfolded during a period of exceptional challenge for the Community. It began with the strategic frameworks of Vision 2050 and the Community Strategic Framework 2023–2027 in place, and with the institutional architecture inherited from earlier terms operational. It closed with those frameworks intact and operational, with the Community having weathered its most consequential institutional shock in fifty years, and with a set of concrete deliverables—the Counter-Terrorism Brigade Roadmap, the AAGP Inter-Governmental Agreement, the digital transformation instruments, the Golden Jubilee legacy commitments, the successful electoral cycle in five Member States, the restoration of Guinea to constitutional order, the new Headquarters in Abuja—on the record.

The term also closed with a set of unfinished tasks and unresolved constraints that will devolve to the incoming management. The Counter-Terrorism Brigade is roadmapped but not yet activated. The AES structured engagement has produced the framework agreement architecture, but the substantive agreements are not yet concluded. The Community Levy remains chronically under-mobilised. The organogram remains under-staffed. The single currency remains an aspiration, though now on a phased basis. The EU Pillar Assessment remains in preparation. These are not failures of the current management alone; they are, in most cases, features of the Community's structural constraints that have accumulated over multiple terms. They now form the substantive agenda for the incoming management.

This Compendium has attempted, in accordance with the honest-record principle set out in the Foreword, to present the term's performance as it stands. It has neither inflated the achievements nor diminished the challenges. It has attributed shortfalls to structural, financial and political-economy factors rather than to individual or institutional failures. It has sought to be evidence-based, drawing on the Community's primary sources and, in particular, on the Final Communiqué of the 69th Ordinary Session of the Authority at Lungi on 19 July 2026.

The Community that H.E. General Birame Diop will inherit on 1 September 2026 is a Community that has demonstrated resilience through difficult circumstances. The macroeconomic environment is now improving. The security architecture is being strengthened. The political transitions in several Member States have consolidated. The Community's normative frameworks—the free movement, the Customs Union, the single currency programme, the human rights and democracy architecture—remain in place. The incoming management inherits both the achievements to build upon and the constraints to overcome.

It is offered in that spirit of continuity and accountability.

NOTE ON THE COMPANION ANNEX VOLUME

A separate Companion Annex Volume accompanies this Compendium and contains the following supporting materials:

- **Annex A** - Community Levy detailed data series, 2022–2026, including cumulative assessed, received, and outstanding balances by Member State and by year;
- **Annex B** - Workforce and vacancy data, including the pre- and post-AES-withdrawal grade breakdown, and the organogram assessment reference;
- **Annex C** - The AES Negotiation Risk Register (Version 1.1), covering the forty-eight risks identified across financial, programmatic, security, political, legal, and operational domains;
- **Annex D** - Detailed record of Community Court of Justice cases filed and disposed during the term, with the landmark judgments identified;
- **Annex E** - GIABA mutual evaluation and follow-up report schedule for the term;
- **Annex F** - Detailed record of Election Observation Missions deployed;
- **Annex H** - Reference documents list.

The Companion Annex Volume is published as a separate document to preserve the main Compendium as a concise handover record within the sixty-page target, while retaining the detailed supporting evidence in accessible form for reference by the incoming management, the statutory organs, and the Community's development partners.

